Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction and the Hard-Core Youth by Hogan, Christine
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 51 Number 3 Article 4 
1974 
Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction and the Hard-Core Youth 
Christine Hogan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hogan, Christine (1974) "Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction and the Hard-Core Youth," North Dakota Law 
Review: Vol. 51 : No. 3 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol51/iss3/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
NOTES
WAIVER OF JUVENILE JURISDICTION
AND THE HARD-CORE YOUTH
[I] do not think we can escape the fact that after our
decision today there will be many impressionable 16- and 17-
year olds who will be packed off to adult prisons where they
will serve their time with hardened criminals. These children
will be sentenced, moreover, without any meaningful inquiry
into the possibility of rehabilitation through humane juvenile
disposition. Sometimes I think our treatment of these hopeless
"criminals" is dictated by the age-old principle "out-of-sight
-out of mind." Yet there is no denying the fact that we can-
not write these children off forever. Someday they will grow
up and at some point they will have to be freed from incar-
ceration. We will inevitably hear from the Blands and Kents
again, and the kind of society we have in the years to come




When a violent crime such as murder, forcible rape or armed
robbery is committed by a 16- or 17-year-old youth, chances are
that in most states the youth will end up being tried in an adult
court rather than in a juvenile court.2 Although the courts and
legislatures have not regarded this phenomenon as a particular prob-
lem,s this note proposes to show that the welfare of our society
as well as the welfare of the youth accused of a violent crime is
1. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1974).
2. The majority of juvenile courts transfer only a small number of their total caseload
to adult court, but in cases involving older "hard-core" youths who have been involved in
assaultive and violent conduct and where a grave felony is charged the transfer rate is
high. See Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Transfer
of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A Policy Statement, 8 CRimE & DELIN-
QUENCY 3, 10-11 (1962).
3. This is evidenced by the fact that until recently transfer provisions in state statutes
have been taken for granted. They have been challenged only on procedural grounds
rather than on substantive or policy considerations. In the years since the watershed de-
cision in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), however, transfer provisions have
been subjected to criticism by courts and commentators. See text accompanying note 13,
infra. See Stamm, Transfer of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the Proceed-
ing, Its Role in the Administration of Justice, and a Proposal for the Reform of Kentucky
Law, 62 Ky. L.J. 122, 127-30, & nn.9 & 10 (1973).
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best served by keeping the youth within the juvenile system. Es-
sentially the question is: Does the hard-core, violent youth' have
the right to the rehabilitative treatment of the juvenile system or
is adult prison his only destiny?
II. SHOULD HARD-CORE YOUTHS BE EXCLUDED FROM THE
JUVENILE COURT?
Since the creation by statute of the first juvenile court system
in Illinois in 1899, 5 children who break society's criminal laws have
been treated differently than adult lawbreakers.6 Juvenile court is
more than just another judicial body; it is another system of justice
with different procedures, a different penalty structure, and a dif-
ferent philosophy than adult court.7 The juvenile system was created
for the purpose of helping and rehabilitating children and presum-
ably it exists today for the same reason." This philosophy of re-
habilitation has a loophole, however, because nearly every state has
privisions whereby a youth can be prosecuted in criminal court.'
The question arises: When, if ever, should youths be abandoned by
the juvenile court and forced to face regular criminal process?
Recently, more and more authorities are concluding that the
answer is "never," and even the hardest of the hard-core youths
should remain in juvenile court.'0 But ironically, at the same time
4. In this note the term "hard-core youth" refers to youths who have been charged with
a grave crime such as murder, forcible rape or armed robbery; who have repeatedly ei-
gaged in conduct characterized by violence or sexual aggression; and who have not re-
sponded to treatment in the Juvenile system so far. This is the difficult case, the typical
"hopeless" case that is the most likely candidate for waiver. See, e.g., United States v.
Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
5. Law of July 1, 1899, §§ 1-21 (1899), Ill. Laws 131-37.
6. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909). This article is the clas-
sic statement of reforms hoped to he brought about by the parens patriae philosophy. But
Judge Mack does not question the necessity for transfer provisions in the juvenile court
laws. Id. at 108-09. This indicates that from the beginning of the juvenile system it was
taken for granted that some children, involved in serious crimes, were simply beyond the
reach of the rehabilitative powers of the Juvenile system. The conclusion that waiver for
some youths has always been taken for granted was reached by Mortimer J. Stamm, in
his enlightened and exhaustive study of the subject of waiver. Stamm, supra note 3, at 146.
7. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion)';
see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1971).
8. See Mack, supra note 6, at 107. The rehabilitative purpose of the North Dekota
Juvenile Court Act is set out in N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01(2) (1974). This section states
that the "Juvenile Court Act" shall be construed to effect the purpose of removing from
delinquent children the consequences of criminal behavior and substituting a program of
treatment, training and rehabilitation.
9. The North Dakota provision is found in N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1974). See
also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 707 (West 1972) ; COLO. RIv. STAT. ANN. § -37-19-3(2)
(Supp. 1965) ; ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (1972) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.1251 (1971).
For other state provisions, see Stamm, supra note 3, at 126 n.6. New York and Vermont
repealed their transfer provisions in 1967. Id. New York enacted a Youthful Offender
Procedure, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 81 720 et. seq. (McKinney 1971). This program at-
tempts to provide rehabilitation, but a youth convicted of a crime under an indictment
charging a grave felony Is ineligible for the rehabilitative treatment. N.Y. CRiM. Paoc.
LAW § 720.10(2) (a) (McKinney 1971). Thus the hard-core youth is subjected to regular
criminal process anyway. See Note, New York State Youthful Offender Procedure, 17 N.Y.
LAW F. 1089 (1972).
10. Bazelon, Racism, Classm, and the Juvenile Process, 58 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 373 (1970).:
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that the commentators on juvenile law are recommending that waiv-
er 1' be eliminated, there is a movement in some states and in the
District of Columbia to make waiver to adult court easier, even au-
tomatic in the case of the hard-core youth.1
2
This movement can be described as a legislative reaction to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Kent v. United States.'3
Kent is a landmark case that has had the overall effect of making
waiver of a juvenile more difficult; 14 it requires ceremony rather
than simple or automatic procedures. 5 The Court held that before
a juvenile judge may transfer a youth to adult court, the Constitution
requires a hearing "sufficient in the particular circumstances to sat-
isfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness."' 16 It has
been generally conceded that the Kent holding guarantees certain
To brand a child a criminal for life is harsh enough retribution for almost
any offense. But it becomes an all but inconceivable response when we realize
that to so brand him may in fact make him a criminal for life. The stigma
of a criminal conviction may itself be a greater handicap in later life than
an entire misspent youth. More important, casting a youthful offender to the
wolves who prowl adult jails may well dash any hope that he will mature to
be a civilized man. On the other hand, there is some hope that a youth can
be recalled from the wrong road he has started down-whether by psychi-
atric help, a changed environment, proper schooling, or even just attention
and understanding.
Id.
See Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction, An Evaluation of the Process in the
Juvenile Court, 9 CRIME & DELIQUENCY 121, 128 (1963) (recommending the gradual elimi-
nation of waiver of juvenile jurisdiction); Stamm, supra note 3, at 149 (concluding that
strict adherence to the principles of juvenile law warrant the elimination of waiver).
The conclusion that juveniles should never be transferred, should perhaps be quali-
fied to allow for the case of the youth who may voluntarily elect to be tried in adult court
for various reasons. For example, it could be advantageous for 17-year olds with a long
Juvenile record to be tried in adult court for a minor offense carrying a light penalty.
The juvenile court could Impose a stiffer punishment than adult court for the same of-
fense because juvenile court dispositions are a discretionary decision of the judge. To
alleviate this problem in North Dakota, the Judicial Council is presently proposing to the
legislature an amendment to the North Dakota Juvenile Court Act which will allow auto-
matic waiver if the youth requests to be tried in adult court.
In the case of the hard-core youth charged with a grave crime, the advantages of
juvenile court disposition are more apparent in that the juvenile Judge may not sentence
a youth to adult prison in North Dakota. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-31 (1974).
11. The terms "waiver" and "transfer" are used interchangeably in this note, although
technical distinctions have been pointed out by some authorities as to the proper usage of
the terms. See Advisory Council of Judges, supra note 2, at 4.
12. For example, in 1973, Colorado amended its Children's Code which had formerly re-
quired a full investigation and a hearing before waiver could be considered under CoLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-4(4) (a) (Supp. 1967). The new statute gives the district attorney
discretion to file an information in criminal court in the case of enumerated serious
felonies. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-4(b) (i-iii) (Supp. 1973).
In 1970 Congress amended the Family Court Act of the District of Columbia to
allow automatic waiver of youths charged with enumerated crimes. D.C. CODE ANN. §
16-2301(3) (Supp. V, 1972).
13. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir
1972) (dissenting opinion) (contending that Congress amended the District of Columbia
Juvenile court act to circumvent Kent). Cf. People v. Bombacino, 51 Ill. 2d 17, 280 N.E.2d
697 (1972) ; People v. Jiles, 43 Ill. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969).
14. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1339-41 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
15. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). A good example of an "automatic"
waiver procedure is found In D.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-2301(3) (Supp. V, 1972).
16. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966); see United States v. Bland, 472
F.2d 1329, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion) (constitutional requirement).
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procedural rights to a youth by constitutional mandate,17 at least
when the waiver is effected by a judge. 8
The problem lies in the fact that not all states accomplish the
waiver procedure by decision of the juvenile judge,19 although this
method is the most common.2 0 There are three basic vehicles set
up in the various juvenile court acts by which a youth may be trans-
ferred to adult court: 21 (1) Judicial-a juvenile judge can transfer
as a matter of discretion; (2) Legislative-enumerated crimes may
be removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court; and (3)
Prosecutorial-the prosecutor is given discretion as to which cases
should be filed in criminal court.
2 2
Which one of the three waiver procedures is employed in a
given case becomes a crucial question in the case of the hard-core
youth .2  The question is, in essence, who should make the waiver
decision: the judge, the legislature, or the prosecutor?
A. JUDICIAL METHOD
Traditionally when a question affecting an individual's substan-
tial rights is to be decided, 24 the repository of such a decision is
17. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966). The specific procedural rights
guaranteed by Kent are: notice, right to counsel, access by counsel to the social records
of the youth, and a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision.
18. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 335 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bland,
472 F.2d 1929, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion). Judge Wright's position is that
the procedural requirements of Kent are mandated by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment regardless of whether the juvenile judge or the prosecutor makes the waiver
decision. Bland, at 1342-43. But the majority opinion In Bland eschews this argument. Id.
at 1335-37. The states which choose not to follow Kent have relied n'the fact that Kent
was concerned only with the statutory scheme of the District of Columbia which reposed
the waiver decision exclusively in the juvenile court. People v. Bombacino, 51 Ill. 2d 17,
18, 280 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1972). For a particularly blatant defiance of Kent, see People v.
Jiles, 43 I1. 2d-145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969). The Supreme Court of Illinois declares:
[Wihile It may be highly desirable to commit to the judge of a specialized
juvenile court the determination of whether or not a particular juvenile Is
to be prosecuted criminally, we are aware of no constitutional requirement
that a state must do so.
Illinois has chosen not to do so.
The role of the Judge of the juvenile division is sharply diminished. He
may do nothing if the juvenile elects to be prosecuted criminally, and If the
prosecutor elects to proceed criminally, he may, by noting his objection, bring
about a hearing before the chief judge of the circuit.
Id. at -, 251 N.E.2d at 531.
The constitutional dimensions of the Kent decision are at present, unclear. See
Significant Development, Juvenil6 Justice-Statutory Exclusion from the Juvenile Process
of Certain Alleged Pelons, 53 3.U.L. REv. 212, 218-19 (1973); State v. Grayer, 191 Neb.
523, -, 215 N.W.2d 859, 862 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
19. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-4(b) (i-ii) (Supp. 1973); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 43-202 (1968) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-7 (1967).
20. Stamm, supra note 3, at 140.
21. Id. at 138.
22. Id.
23. Refer to text accompanying notes 42-43.
24. The decision whether a youth Is to be treated as an adult or a juvenile affects the
youth's substantial rights. The determination to be made is not whether the youth should
be prosecuted, but rather the process by which guilt Or Innocence is to be determined and,
if guilt is found, the types of punishment or rehabilitative measures to be taken. Whatever
sentence Is pronounced, one treated as an adult is sentenced to a regular prison. In con-
trast, a juvenile may be Incarcerated in a public or private agency designed for the cus-
NOTES 659
the judiciary25 This is fitting because judicial proceedings must be
accompanied by all the trappings of due process-notice, opportunity
for full and fair hearing, right to counsel . 2  Under the juvenile
codes of most states, where the concept of special treatment for
juveniles is fostered, waiver decisions are usually made by judicial
officers after adversary fact-finding proceedings. 21 The primary
criticism aimed at the Judicial method is that the juvenile judge's
discretion is sometimes exercised in the absence of any clear guide-
lines or standards, when the waiver decision is determined. 2  This
problem can be remedied by incorporating clearly defined standards
in the waiver statute. 29
B. LEGISLATIVE METHOD
Some state codes, and until recently the Federal Juvenile Deln-
quency Act,80 simply exclude certain youths who have been charged
with certain crimes from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.81
This is known as the Legislative waiver method, but in reality there
is no waiver because juvenile jurisdiction has never attached. 2 The
legislature has classified certain hard-core crimes such as murder
or rape as "adult" and any person, over a minimum age, charged
with such a crime is treated as an adult.8 There is no doubt that
tody, care, subsistence, education and rehabilitation of juveniles. Cox v. United States, 473
F.2d 334, 341 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966).
25. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 335 (4th Cir. 1973).
26. Id.
27. The Judicial procedure is followed in North Dakota as it is in most states. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1974).
28. People v. Fields, 388 Mich. 66, 77, 199 N.W.2d 217, 221-22 (1972) (holding a waiver
statute without standards unconstitutional).
29. The North Dakota waiver statute provides clear guidelines for the juvenile judge
to follow in making the waiver decision. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(d)(1-4) (1974).
For full text of statute, see note 100, infra.
30. Congress has recently passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974, 88 Stat. 1109. Title V of the Act contains amendments to the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42 (1970). Sections 5031 and 5032, as amended, significantly
change the federal waiver procedure. Under the old law, a youth alleged to have committed
an act punishable by death or life Imprisonment was legislatively excluded from juvenile
court jurisdiction. Furthermore, the prosecutor was vested with the discretionary power
to file an information against any youth not thus excluded.
The new amendment appears to change both the Legislative and Prosecutorial ele-
ments of the old federal waiver procedure. Under section 5031 all youths including those
alleged to have committed acts punishable by death or life imprisonment are included
within the definition of "Juvenile" for jurisdictional purposes. Under section 5032 Prose-
cutorial discretion is now limited by the requirement of a hearing on the issue of waiver
In district court.
These changes in the federal waiver procedure, by providing the judicial method
of waiver for all youths, appear to bring the federal procedure into compliance with Kent.
It Is too early to speculate, but this federal legislation may trigger a movement away from
the Legislative and Prosecutorial models back to the traditional judicial guarantees of due
process. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). A further analysis of the effects
of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 is left to other writers.
31. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570A(S) (1968). See Shornhorst, The Waiver of
Juvenile Court Jurlsdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 Inn. L.J. 583, 596-97 (1968).
32. Stamnm, supra note 3, at 139.
33. This waiver method Is a policy decision of the legislative body that because a grave
crime is charged the youth must be hard-core, a hopeless case, beyond the rehabilitative
powers of the juvenile system. It is tantamount to saying that a youth who commits a
serious offense cannot be rehabilitated and must be sent to criminal court. "There is no'
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the legislature may make such a classification, 8' but this exclusion
of serious crimes from juvenile jurisdiction not only denies the ac-
cused youth any opportunity to be heard on the waiver issue, but
seems to be inconsistent with the rehabilitative philosophy of the
juvenile court.85
C. PROSECUTORIAL METHOD
The Prosecutorial waiver procedure allows a prosecutor to de-
termine the forum in which a youth charged with a serious crime
will be tried.36 This method may be expedient, 7 but the criticism
to which it has been subjected is intense.3 8 The major drawback
to this approach to waiver, at least from the point of view of
those interested in protecting the rights of the hard-core youth, is
that the traditional protections of due process that must accompany
judicial proceedings have never been held applicable to processes
of prosecutorial decision-making. 9 When a state legislature gives
the waiver decision-making power to the prosecutor rather than the
juvenile judge, due process need not apply.40 It is undeniable that
the employment of the Prosecutorial or the Legislative waiver pro-
cedure will have serious consequences for the hard-core youth be-
evidence that this procedure is in the best interest of either the child or society; rather
there is a mountain of demonstrable data indicating that it is deleterious to both." Stamm,
supra note 3, at 139.
34. The state legislatures are under no constitutional requirement to maintain a juve-
nile court or to establish special facilities for the treatment of a special class of "Juvenile"
offenders. People v. Jiles, 43 Ill. 2d 145, 148, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1969).
35. Shornhorst, supra note 31, at 597.
36. The Prosecutorial waiver procedure is currently used in states wishing to evade the
force of Kent and shortcut their hard-core youths into adult court. J. Skelly Wright refers
to this method as the old "out of sight, out of mind" theory in United States v. Bland.
472 F.2d 1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
Examples of Prosecutorial statutory schemes are: CoO. REv. STAT. ANx. 3 22-1-4
(b)(i-il) (Supp. 1973) ; NEB. PEV. STAT. § 43-202 (1968) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 3 702-7
(1967). For cases discussing this waiver method see Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334
(4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d
1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973) ; Myers v. District Court, 518 P.2d
836 (Colo. 1974) ; People v. Rahn, 15 Ill. App. 3d 170, 304 N.E.2d 161 (1973) ; People v.
Bombacino, 51 Ill. 2d 17, 280 N.E.2d 697 (1972); People v. Handley, 51 IIl. 2d 229, 282
N.E.2d 131 (1972) ; People v. Jiles, 48 Ill. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969) ; State v. Grayer,
191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974).
37. United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd 472 F.2d 1329
(D.C. Cir. 1972). At the appellate level, the state's interest in expedient procedures is
discussed in Bland. "In Kent the Supreme Court weighed the grievious consequences of a
Waiver decision against the Government's relatively meager interest in summary pro-
cedures. In the end the Court struck the balance in favor of fair procedures .... " United
States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
38. United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34, 37-38 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v.
Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion) ; Shornhorst, supra note
81, at 598-99. The difficulty in permitting the prosecutor to make the waiver decision is
obvious: the prosecution represents the state. He cannot be expected to objectively weigh
the best interests of the youth against the state's interest in obtaining convictions. See
Shornhorst, supra note 31, at 599. "The transfer of the waiver decision from the neutral
Judge to the partisan prosecutor inereases rather than diminishes the need for due process.
I . ." United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1343, 1344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting
opinion).
39. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 834, 336 (4th Cik. 1978).0
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cause in either case he is denied the opportunity to show that in
spite of the charge against him he is amenable to rehabilitation
within the juvenile framework. 41 The end result of using either the
Legislative or the Prosecutorial waiver procedure is that the hard-
core youth will be charged in adult court, never having been given
a waiver hearing with counsel and a statement of reasons. 42 If the
youth is convicted he will be sent to adult prison, never having been
given a chance to show that he was entitled to treatment in a
facility for juveniles.4 8
There is little doubt that Kent requires a hearing when the Ju-
dicial method is employed to waive a youth,44 but in the years
since Kent, there has been uncertainty as to whether the Kent guar-
antees of due process must be applied to the Legislative and Prose-
cutorial schemes as well.42  The argument can be made that of
the three methods, the Judicial method alone has constitutional val-
idity. If the Judicial method is employed, a youth within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the juvenile court cannot be waived before he
is given a due process hearing, whereas both the Legislative and
Prosecutorial methods deprive the youth of this right.48 However,
state and federal courts have upheld the statutes setting up the
Legislative and Prosecutorial modes of waiver when challenged on
constitutional grounds .4  Until the United States Supreme Court de-
finitively declares that a youth cannot be tried in adult court with-
out first being given a due process hearing under all circumstances,
the states will no doubt continue to employ these short-cut proced-
41. Id.
42. United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34, 37 (D.D.C. 1971) ; United States v. Bland.
472 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
42. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
43. United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34, 37 (D.D.C. 1971).
44. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
45. Bland v. United States, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ; Cox v. United States, 473
F.2d 334, 341-42 (4th Cir. 1973) (suggesting that prosecutor receive evidence on waiver
Issue and state his reasons for the decision to waive).
46. Whether Kent rests on constitutional or statutory grounds seems to be the key fac-
tor in determining whether or not the Legislative or Prosecutorial methods of transferring
jurisdiction are constitutional. The statutory frameworks of the District of Columbia, D.C.
Cops AwN. § 16-2301(3) (a) (Supp. V, 1972) and of the State of Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, §§ 702-7 (1967), for example, are premised upon the assumption that Kent describes
rights based solely on statute. But there are convincing arguments that Kent is of consti-
tutional dimensions. These arguments are set out In Bland v. United States, 472 P.2d 1329,
1339-48 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion). Judge Wright's constitutional argument Is
discussed in Significant Development, Juvenile Justice--Statutory Exclusion from the Juve-
nile Process of Certain Alleged Felons, 53 B.U.L. REv. 212, 218-19 (1973).
The Legislative and Prosecutorial waiver procedures currently provide no procedural
due process rights to the youth because the prosecutorial decision has never been encum-
bered with the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Cox v. United
States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1973). But Judge Wright In his dissent In Bland, eLr-
gues that the prosecutor as well as a Juvenile judge should have the responsibility to
apply the procedural rights expounded in Kent, If the prosecutor Is going to make the
waiver decision. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting
opinion).
47. See, e.g., People v. Handley, 51 Ill. 2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131 (1972) ; State v. Grayer,
191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974).
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ures.4 1 The wide discrepancy between the various states in the rights
afforded to youths of the same age and class demonstrates a need
for some semblance of uniformity, which only a Supreme Court de-
cision could provide. As matters stand now, a youth charged with
a serious crime in Illinois is afforded no right to be heard in ju-
venile court as to whether or not he is amenable to rehabilitation
within the juvenile system. 49 Whereas in North Dakota, a youth
of the same age and charged with the same offense is given a
hearing on this issue as a matter of right.50
The most recent development spearheading the movement toward
easier, i.e., Prosecutorial, waiver procedures occurred in the very
jurisdiction in which Kent was held to apply-Washington, D. C.
In 1970, the United States Congress, acting in its role as the exclu-
sive legislative body for the District of Columbia, converted its for-
merly Judicial waiver procedures into a combination Legislative-
Prosecutorial scheme.5 1 The new statute permits a youth charged
by the prosecutor with an enumerated felony, i.e., murder, forcible
rape, armed robbery or assault with intent to commit such offense,
to be excluded automatically from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.12 A youth charged under such a procedure would not be en-
titled to a Kent hearing in juvenile court because juvenile jurisdiction
does not attach if the prosecutor decides to charge the youth with
one of the specified felonies.
5 3
The case which challenged the constitutionality of this procedure,
but which ultimately failed to have it struck down, is United States
v. Bland.5
Bland represents a disturbing change in the law of waiver of
juvenile jurisdiction because it permits a statutory scheme to com-
pletely negate the due process requirements of Kent in cases involv-
ing hard-core youths.5 5 A statutory transfer of the waiver decision-
making power from the judiciary to the executive arm in effect
48. In United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1972), two judges, Leven-
thai and McGowan, invited the United States Supreme Court to settle the question. Be-
cause the District of Columbia statute under constitutional attack in Bland contains ele-
ments of both the Legislative and Prosecutorial methods of waiver, a Supreme Court de-
cision could have eliminated much controversy. The Supreme Court declined the invitation
to hear the Bland case. United States v. Bland, 412 U.S. 909 (1974).
49. See People v. Jiles, 43 Il1. 2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969).
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1974).
51. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3) (A) (Supp. IV, 1971).
52. This was accomplished by legislatively turning children into adults upon being
charged with one of the enumerated felonies. The new amendment, D.C. CODE ANN. §
16-2301(3) (Supp. V, 1972):
The term "child" means an individual who is under 18 years of age, ex-
cept that the term "child" does not include an individual who Is sixteen years
of age or older and (A) charged by the United States Attorney with (1) mur-
der, forcible rape, burglary in the first degree, robbery while armed, or as-
sault with intent to commit any such offense....
Id.
53. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1829, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1889.
NoTEs
strips a youth of the Kent safeguards primarily because the guarantee
of a hearing found in the due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments has traditionally been limited to judicial
and quasi-judicial proceedings. 8 It has never been held applicable
to the process of prosecutorial decision-making.
57
Jerome Bland was 16 years old when arrested and indicted for
armed robbery of a post office. He did not receive a waiver from
juvenile court because he was charged as an adult under the new
statute giving the United States attorney the discretionary power
to remove a juvenile from the category of "child" simply by charg-
ing him with one of the enumerated felonies. 5 8 In United States
District Court, Bland moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that the statute denied him procedural due process.59 The district
court agreed, dismissed the indictment and declared the statute to
be a violation of the presumption of innocence, a denial of basic
due process and equal protection, and a denial of the Kent hearing8 0
A divided Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the judgment, upholding the statute."' The strength of
the appellate court holding is questionable, however, because a ma-
jority of the nine active judges on the Court of Appeals did not
agree with the three-judge panel decision. Chief Judge Bazelon,
a leading authority on juvenile law, adhered to the dissent written
by J. Skelly Wright.
6 2
Bland's petition for a rehearing en banc was denied with four
separate statements filed. Two judges 63 noted that the reason they
denied rehearing was the "constitutional nature of the question, as
one calling ultimately for resolution by the Supreme Court. .. .""
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of
certiorari,6 5 although Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred.
8
Due to the division in both the Court of Appeal's and the Su-
preme Court's treatment of Bland, the fundamental question of wheth-
er Kent is a constitutional due process requirement remains unsettled
in the case of the hard-core youth. Despite this uncertainty, Bland
56. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1973).
57. Id.
58. The danger of abuses which could result from placing unbridled discretion in the
hands of a prosecutor interested in accumulating convictions is hinted at in the lower
court opinion in United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34, 35, 36, 38-39 (D.D.C. 1971).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 37-38.
61. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
62. Id. at 1351. See Significant Development, Juvenile Justice-Statutory Exclusion from
the Juvenile Justice Process of Certain Alleged Felons, 53 B.U.L. REv. 212, 213 n.10 (1978).
It is of interest that Ronald N. Davies, U.S. Senior District Judge for the District
of North Dakota, joined Wilkey, Circuit Judge, in making up the two-man majority.
63. McGowan and Leventhal, J.J.
64. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
65. United States v. Bland, 412 U.S. 909 (1974).
66. Id.
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is now being followed. The majority opinion is relied on for the
proposition that vesting discretionary power in the prosecutor to pro-
ceed against juveniles in the criminal court is not an unconstitutional
practice. 7 It is therefore worthwhile to examine some of the reasons
that were given by the United States Congress as to why waiver
to adult court was considered necessary in cases involving hard-core
youths. Congress amended the District of Columbia Code to allow
automatic waiver, thus flying in the face of Kent. This amendment
was upheld in Bland. If the Congress has good reasons for effecting
such a change, then there is nothing to stop the states from amend-
ing their juvenile court acts to exclude the hard-core youth in pre-
cisely the same manner.
III. REASONS FOR WAIVER
The legislative history accompanying the D.C. Code § 2301
reveals that Congress wished to remove individuals between the
ages of 16 and 18 who were considered beyond rehabilitation in the
juvenile system69 and whose presence in that system would have
a negative influence on the rest of the juvenile community. 70 Con-
gress wished to separate the hard-core, violent, repeat offenders
from others of the same chronological age who might be susceptible
to juvenile treatment.7 1 The legislative history of this D.C. Code
Section points out:
[t]he shocking failure . . . of the machinery of justice to
bring to punishment admitted murderers, rapists and others
guilty of aggravated assaults and robberies. This is a crime
infested city; let there be no ignoring that fact! 72
These reasons put forth by Congress are less than compelling
when considered separately.
A. A PERSON WHO COMMITS A VIOLENT CRIME IS BEYOND REHABILI-
TATION IN THE JUVENILE SYSTEM.
This reason is not logical. Amenability to rehabilitation depends
on the personal characteristics of the individual youth, which cannot
possibly be taken into consideration by a statute that looks to the
67. See, e.g., State v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 525, 215 N.W.2d 859, 860 (1974).
68. S. REP. No. 620, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1969) ; H.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 50 (1970).
69. The Senate Committee on the District of Columbia revealed its definition of "beyond
rehabilitation" stating: "A juvenile can reliably be considered too . . . sophisticated for
and beyond the reach of, mere juvenile therapy if the particular juvenile has already been
exposed in years of relative discretion, to the juvenile system and treated to the extent
that his case required. . . . and has nevertheless returned to serious misconduct. ... I S.
REP. No. 620, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1969).
70. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (interpreting the legis-
lative history accompanying D.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-2301).
71. Id.
72. 1. RP. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (1970).
664,
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offense committed as a means of determining who is susceptible
to rehabilitation and who is not.7
8
Congress presumes that if the police charged a youth with one
of the enumerated offenses, 74 he must have committed that offense,
and further, that, in light of the gravity of the offense, he is, there-
fore, a sophisticated criminal and should be withdrawn from the
juvenile system. 75 This short-cut method for removing those youths
arrested for violent crimes is a violation of the basic presumption
of innocence and thus contrary to the Due Process Clause of the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, according to the
district court in Bland v. United States.
7 6
B. THE PRESENCE OF HARD-CORE, SOPHISTICATED YOUTHS WOULD
HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OTHERS WITHIN THE JUVENILE COMMU-
NITY.
Congress is probably correct in its conclusion that violent, so-
phisticated youths should be separated from other youths more likely
to be "redeemable" in juvenile court. 77 But this is not to say
that the separation should be brought about by processing the hard-
core youths in criminal court and locking them up in adult prison.
7
1
Providing separate facilities and treatment within the juvenile system
for violent youth seems to be an infinitely more humane approach.¢9
73. H .R. RPl. Nos. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1970). Congress admitted that
another reason for wanting to exclude serious felonies from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court was the "difficulties" of waiving hard-core offenders "under the present law." Id.
The Committee is, of course, referring to the obstacles to waiver thrown up by the Kent
decision, i.e., notice, hearing, statement of reasons, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Judge Wright is
quick to point this out in his dissent in United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1341 (D.C. C11.
1972) (dissenting opinion). Justice Douglas agrees with Wrights' interpretation In his dis-
senting opinion from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, Bland v. United States, 412
U.S. 909 (1974).
74. See Mountford & Berenson, Waiver of Jurisdiction: The Last Resort of the Juvenile
Court, 18 RAN. L. REv. 55 (1972) :
When the nature of the offense is the sole criterion for deciding In which
court a juvenile will be tried, it becomes more probable that a juvenile will
be tried as an adult if he has committed a serious offense and handled as a
Juvenile If his offense Is minor. It would be more consistent with the purposes
of a Juvenile code if waiver were based on findings about the child rather
than on findings about the offense. The amenability of the child to rehabili-
tation should be a more important criterion than the heinousness of the of-
fense.
Id. at 62.
75. D.C. ConE ANN. § 16-2301(8) (A) (Supp. IV, 1971) (for full text of statute see note
52, supra).
76. United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34, 37 (D.D.C. 1971).
77. See Significant Development, supra note 62, at 224.
78. By this argument, Congress Is either completely abandoning the hard-core youth
and concentrating only on the redeemable children for purposes of treatment and re-
habilitation, or else it is assuming that the adult criminal system has facilities available
to it which the juvenile court lacks for treatment of hard-core youths.
According to Sargent & Gordon, Waiver of Jurisdiction, An Evaluation of the
Process in the Juvenile Court, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 121 (1963): "The only thing a
prison can do well is keep prisoners under lock and key. If the avowed purpose is re-
habilitation or treatment, one can hardly imagine a more useless place than a prison."
Id at 124.
79. The inhumanity of treating children as adults for purposes of correction and re-
habilitation was tragically brought to light in United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1351
(D.C. Cir. 1972). One of the causes of a prisoners' riot at the District of Columbia jail
666 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Separate juvenile facilities are preferable over prison as a solution
to the problem of what to do with the violent youth when the long
range societal effects are considered. 0
Looking ahead to the release of the hard-core youth, who has
served in an adult prison,"' we might well wish we had heeded
the warnings expressed by Judge Wright as to the kind of society
we can expect then. 2 The fact is that adult prison makes a hard-
core youth harder and more aggressive.8 3 We perhaps do not know
whether or not a 17-year-old violent youth can be rehabilitated, 4
but human experience tells us that no personality is completely un-
salvageable at the age of seventeen. 5 The mere fact of lack of
years implies some measure of malleability and adaptability. 6
If juvenile court is not permitted to try to rehabilitate hard-core
youths and to treat them in a facility designed for the purpose of
treating and containing the violent child, it is useless to look to
the criminal court for rehabilitative facilities . 7
When the juvenile court washes its hands of a child, it throws
him on the scrap heap of prison and it gains nothing by em-
ploying euphemisms to describe this tragedy. . . . As long
was the homosexual assaults by the adult prisoners on the 16- and 17-year-old children
being held as 'adult' prisoners. One of the rioters' demands was that the children b,3
segregated at the jail to protect them from the other inmates. Sargent and Gordon, In
discussing this problem stated:
Anyone familiar with prisons knows that the weakest-which usually means
the youngest-prisoners are victimized by the strongest. . . . Thus the child
who is sent to prison is likely to be the target of every "wolf" inside the wall.
If he does not succumb to this assault, he may be driven out of self-defense, to
become even more aggressive than he was when he entered.
Sargent & Gordon, supra note 78, at 125.
80. See United States v. Bland,, 472 F.2d 1329, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
81. That the Imprisoned youth must be released at some time seems certain. Work-
man v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). This case held that although
the penalty of life imprisonment without benefit of parole may be imposed on adult of-
fenders convicted of rape, the same punishment Is cruel and unusual when applied to
juvenile offenders, even though they were tried as adults in criminal court. The holding
is based on the rationale that the legislature intended to provide a life sentence without
parole In rape cases to deal with "dangerous and Incorrigible individuals who would be a
constant threat to society." Id. at 378.
But since the Court refuses to believe that a juvenile, by reason of his youth, must
necessarily be incorrigible for the rest of his life, he must be given a chance for parole.
Id. at 378.
82. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
83. See generally Sargent & Gordon, supra note 78, at 125; Stamm, supra note 3, at
146, 152 ; Shornhorst, supra note 31, at 586-87.
84. See Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Chief Judge Bazelon
admits:
The job of saving the boy who has compiled a long juvenile record and then
committed a serious offense after his sixteenth birthday may be so costly,
or so difficult even if no cost were spared, that the "full investigation re-
quired by the Statute cannot but be a pious charade In many cases ....
Perhaps it Is only by searching for what we need but do not have that fu-
ture Improvements In knowledge and resources can be hoped for.
Id. at 1280.
85. See Bazelon, supra note 10.
86. Workman v. Commonwealh, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). Stating:
"We believe that incorrigibility Is inconsistent with youth; that It Is impossible to make
a Judgment that a fourteen year old youth, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible
for the rest of his life."
87. See Sargent & Gordon, supra note 78, at 125.
as the juvenile court practices the self-deception that allows
it to believe in the existence of facilities elsewhere, it will
not face squarely the need to develop for itself the tools it
requires to care for these children.88
C. THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE SHOULD PUNISH ADMITTED MUR-
DERERS, RAPISTS AND ROBBERS; THE CITIES ARE CRIME-INFESTED.
Apparently the old saying that punishment serves as a deterrent
to crime has not been laid to its well-deserved rest by enlightened
studies on punishment and criminal theory, 89 but is still very much
cherished and nurtured in the hearts and minds of the Congressmen
who amended the waiver provision for the District of Columbia.9 0
Members of the community and even judges9l still believe that pun-
ishment deters, for when youths commit crimes of violence or sex-
ual aggression, strong community pressure is brought to bear on
the judge to send the child to criminal court.
92
It has been suggested that since punishment in prison neither
rehabilitates nor removes forever from society the child-murderers,
rapists and robbers waived by juvenile court, the principle motive
underlying the entire waiver process must be revenge and retribu-
tion.93 Once this fact is faced by legislatures, courts and the com-
munity, the waiver structure cannot stand. Revenge arguably is no
reason at all to subject a youth to adult prison.9 4 The best interests
of the community as well as the best interests of the youth are
served by making every effort to rehabilitate the hard-core youth
and to eliminate completely the possibility of sending a youth to
adult prison.95 This is, of course, the original philosophy of the ju-
venile system and it can be applied to hard-core youths as well
as to the rest of the juvenile community. This rationale is admirably
stated in the following excerpt:
It would appear that the interests of the state might always
require a prosecution where there has been a relatively seri-
ous crime committed. A criminal prosecution is the only way
that the state can be certain that the offender will be given
a long sentence. The interests of the child, however, may
require rehabilitative treatment at a facility for juveniles
rather than a long sentence at a penal institution. The interests
of the child appear to come into direct conflict with the inter-
ests of the community. The conflict arises, however, not from
88. Id.
89. E.g., A. C. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT (1929) ; JEROME HALL, STUDIES IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY (1958).
90. H.R. REP. Nos. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1970).
91. See, e.g., Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378-79 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968)
(dissenting opinion) (wrongdoers deserve every bit of punishment they receive).
92. Sargeant & Gordon, supra note 78, at 125.
93. Id. at 125-26.
94. Id. at 128; Stamm, aupra note 3, at 149.
95. Mountford & Berenson, supra note 74, at 64-65.
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the result desired, but from the methods to be employed in
reaching that result. Society wants to be assured that the
particular juvenile will not repeat his act. This it hopes to
accomplish by imprisonment for a very long period of time.
But the interests of the child also require cessation of his
deviant behavior. This end, hopefully, can be reached through
the use of rehabilitative treatment. If the desired result can
be reached by either imprisonment or rehabilitation, the spirit
of the juvenile codes demand rehabilitation over imprison-
ment. The juvenile codes were written in order to mitigate
the harsh consequences resulting from the criminal prosecu-
tion of children. If the interests of society are allowed to
justify such a criminal prosecution, it would appear that the
purposes of the juvenile codes are being circumvented.96
It appears that the reasons for excluding hard-core youths from
the juvenile system are theoretically unjustifiable. But since the
states have not yet accepted this proposition, as evidenced by the
presence of waiver provisions in their codes, 97 an examination of
the waiver process as it exists is necessary. However, since this
note is limited to the particular problem areas affecting the hard-
core youth, general treatment of the process is left to other writ-
ers.98 The following examination, however, of the mechanics of the
North Dakota waiver statute may be instructive because North Da-
kota has adopted the Uniform Juvenile Court Act in its entirety.
99
IV. THE NORTH DAKOTA WAIVER PROCESS
The North Dakota waiver statute 00 provides for the Kent re-
quirements: a full hearing on whether transfer should be made,
written notice, guidelines for the court to follow in making findings,
96. Id.
97. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1974). See also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 207
(West 1972) COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-19-3(2) (Supp. 1965) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 87, §8
702-7 (1972) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (1971) ; Stamm, supra note 3, at 126 n.6.
98. For extensive analysis of the waiver process, see Stamm, supra note 3, at 138-64.
99. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-01 to 27-20-59 (1972). See also Note, The Uniform Juve-
nile Court Act, 48 N.D.L. Rv. 93, 94 (1971) (examining provisions of the Act).
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1974) :
1. After a petition has been filed alleging delinquency based on conduct
which is designated a crime or public offense under the laws, including local
ordinances or resolutions of this state, the court before hearing the petition
on its merits may transfer the offense for prosecution to the appropriate
court having jurisdiction of the offense if:
a. The child was sixteen or more years of Age at the time of the al-
leged conduct;
b. A hearing on whether transfer should be made is held in conformity
with sections 27-20-24, 27-20-26, and 27-20-27;
c. Notice in writing of the time, place, purpose of the hearing Is given
to the child and. his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three
days before the hearing;
d. The court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
1. The child committed the delinquent act alleged;
2. The child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juve-
nile through available facilities;
3. The child is not committable to an Institution for the mentally
retarded or mentally Ill; and
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and other basic rights." 1 Thus this statute provides no discernable
grounds for constitutional attack.
The North Dakota transfer provision when considered with other
relevant portions of the Juvenile Court Act, can be interpreted as
providing a statutory presumption in favor of juvenile court juris-
diction, rather than waiver. 10 2 The underlying purpose of the North
Dakota Juvenile Court Act is to protect the children in this state
by removing the taint of criminality from juvenile proceedings. 0 8
This broad purpose would be subverted if the youth had to show
why he should not be transferred. In effect, the statute places the
4. The Interests of the community require that the child be placed
under legal restraint or discipline.
2. The transfer terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the
child with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the petition.
3. No child, either before or after reaching eighteen years of age shall be
prosecuted for an offense previously committed unless the case has been trans-
ferred as provided in this section.
4. Statements made by the child after being taken into custody and prior
to the service of notice under subsection 1 or at the hearing under this sec-
tion are not admissable against him over objection in the criminal proceed-
ings following the transfer.
5. If the case is not transferred the judge who conducted the hearing shall
shall not over objection of an interested party preside at the hearing on the
petition. If the case is transferred to a court of which the judge who con-
ducted the hearing is also a judge, he likewise is disqualified over objection
from presiding in the prosecution.
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-24 (1974) provides for the conduct of the hearing.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1974) provides for right to counsel at all stages of the
proceedings. Counsel must be provided for a child not represented by his parent, guardian,
or custodian.
N.D. CENT. CODE; § 27-20-27 (1974) provides other basic rights required by Kent
and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), such as: opportunity to introduce evidence and to
cross-examine witnesses; privilege against self-incrimination; exclusionary rule for illegally
seized evidence and out-of-court statements. The North Dakota transfer statutes goes fur-
ther than Gault requires in that it provides built-in protections against double jeopardy.
The following provisions in the North Dakota Act provide an effective safeguard against
double Jeopardy: (1) No evidence obtained in or offered in an adjudicatory hearing may
be 'introduced in a subsequent proceeding, except in a post-conviction, presentence in-
vestigation and report after conviction of a felony. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-33(2) (1974) ;
(2) A waiver determination by the juvenile court must take place before a petition al-
leging delinquency is heard on the merits, N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-28(1) (1974) ; (3) No
child may be prosecuted for any offense committed before" the age of eighteen, unless jur-
isdiction is properly waived by the Juvenile court. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(8) (1974).
Double jeopardy remains a danger In some other jurisdictions. See State v. R.E.F.,
251 So. 2d 672 (1st DCA 1971), aff'd 265 So. 2d 701 (Fla, 1972). In R.E.F., a youth was
indicted for rape six days after he was adjudicated a delinquent for the same offense.
The district court of appeal found that the double jeopardy involved did not violate funda-
mental fairness because jeopardy did not attach to the juvenile court adjudicatory hearing.
This holding was based on the theory that the hearing in juvenile court was civil in na-
ture. Id. at 680. But cf. Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court: A Challenge to
Lawyers, 52 A.B.A.J. 923 (1966). Gardner states that although the juvenile court was
established as a civil court under a guardianship philosophy, when the jurisdiction of the
court is invoked in a case involving a crimnal offense, the "civil proceeding" rationale
Is a "legal fiction presenting a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason." Id. at
924. Gardner would undoubtedly consider double jeopardy fundamentally unfair in juvenile
cases as it is in the case of adults because he states: "When the charge is commission of
a crime, rights should be identical, be the accused 16 or 60." Id.
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01 (Supp. 1972). This section provides the interpretation
to be applied throughout the chapter, and, when read in conjunction with N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-03 (1974), which provides exclusive and original jurisdiction to the juvenile court,
creates the presumption in favor of juvenile jurisdiction.
108. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01 (1974).
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burden upon the state to rebut the presumption that the youth should
be treated within the juvenile court jurisdiction. 04
Since the transfer provision spells out the four criteria upon
which the judge is to make specific findings before waiver may be
considered, no extraneous factors should enter into the court's de-
cision. 0 r5 An important argument in favor of keeping a youth charged
with a violent crime within the juvenile system is the fact that
North Dakota has no provision in the transfer section of the Act
allowing the court to consider as a guideline the type, degree or
heinousness of the offense.
One of the criteria upon which the juvenile judge must make
specific findings is that the youth is not "committable" to an in-
stitution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill.1o8 Since many
violent youths are, in fact, mentally disturbed,'0 7 this provision should
provide a means for keeping them out of adult court. The judge's
decision here is discretionary, as in all phases of the "Judicial"
method of waiver.10 But the testimony and reports from psycholo-
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-03(1) (a) (1974). This section defines "child" as person
under the age of eighteen years. The Juvenile Court Act as a whole, seeks to protect and
provide treatment for all children under eighteen. The transfer provision allowing only
children over sixteen to be considered for waiver does not affect this purpose.
105. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1) (d) (1-4) (1974). The four guidelines upon which
the waiver decision is based:
1. After a petition has been filed alleging delinquency based on conduct which
is designated a crime or public offense under the laws, including local ordi-
nances or resolutions of this state, the court before hearing the petition on its
merits may transfer the offense for prosecution to the appropriate court hav-
ing jurisdiction of the offense if:
a. The child was sixteen or more years of age at the time of the alleged
conduct;
b. A hearing on whether transfer should be made is held In conformity
with sections 27-20-24, 27-20-26, and 27-20-27;
c. Notice in writing of the time, place, purpose of the hearing is given
to the child and his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three
days before the hearing;
d. The court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
1. The child committed the delinquent act alleged;
2. The child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a juve-
nile through available facilities;
3. The child is not committable to an institution for the mentally re-
tarded or mentally ill; and
4. The Interests of the community require that the child, be placed un-
der legal restraint or discipline.
2. The transfer terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the
child with respect to the delinquent acts alleged In the petition.
3. No child, either before or ofter reaching eighteen years of age shall be
prosecuted for an offense previously committed unless the case has been
transferred as provided in this section.
4. Statements made by the child after being taken Into custody' and prior to
the service of notice under subsection 1 or at the hearing under this section
are not admissable against him over objection in the criminal proceedings
following the transfer.
5. If the case is not transferred the judge who conducted the hearing shall
not over objection of an interested party preside at the hearing on the peti-
tion. If the case Is transferred to a court of which the judge who conducted
the hearing is also a Judge he likewise is disqualified over objection from pre-
siding in the prosecution.
Id.
106. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(d) (3) (1974).
107. See Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
108. See Stamm. suvra note 3. at 188.
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gists, local mental health centers, private psychiatrists, or any other
person or agency with whom the youth has had contact relevant
to his mental state will add support to the judge's determination. 10 9
It has been suggested that a finding by a judge on an issue such
as committability without benefit of such testimony or reports is
meaningless. 10
The leading case determining the role of the juvenile court at
the transfer hearing with respect to the committability of mentally
disturbed juveniles is the appellate court decision in Kent v. Uni-
ted States (Kent II).211 Morris Kent had engaged in extensive cri-
minal activity characterized by violence and aggressiveness. 1 12 In
1961 at the age of sixteen he was waived by juvenile court and in-
dicted on several counts of robbery, housebreaking and rape. 13
The district court sentenced Kent from thirty to ninety years in pri-
son. 114 This decision was affirmed by the United State Court of Ap-
peals, District of Columbia Circuit," 5 and reversed by the United
States Supreme Court in the landmark Kent decision."" The Su-
preme Court remanded the case to district court for a de novo hear-
ing to determine the validity of the 1961 waiver."17 The district court
again approved the waiver. But the Court of Appeals, hearing the
case for the second time, held in Kent II that because Kent was
severely mentally disturbed, waiver was inappropriate." 8
Morris Kent was a violent, hard-core youth: he had a long his-
tory of contacts with the juvenile court and had not responded
well to that exposure." 9 Because the juvenile court's facilities for
confinement could not provide adequate treatment for a psychotic
youth,'2 0 Kent argued that he should have been civilly committed
by the juvenile court at the original transfer hearing.12' In fact the
district court had determined that Kent was committable, but did
not consider committment to be a valid alternative to waiver, be-
cause it found Kent to be a potential danger to himself and oth-
ers. 22 In Kent II Chief Judge Bazelon stated: "Dangerousness does
109. Psychologist's reports should be admitted into the record at the transfer hearing
to help make "meaningful review" on appeal, should the judge abuse his discretion. Of.
Knott v. Langlois, -R.I.-, -, 231 A.2d 767, 769-70 (1967).
110. See Holys & Solway, The Role of the Psychological Evaluation in Certification o/
Juveniles for Trial as Adults, 9 HOUSTON L. REv. 709, 714 (1972).
111. 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
112. Id. at 413 (dissenting opinion).
113. Id. at 409.
114. Id.
115. Kent v. United States, 119 U.S. App. D.C. 378, 343 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
116. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (Kent I).
117. Id.




122. Id. at 409-10.
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not make civil commitment 'inappropriate'; it makes civil commit-
ment appropriate.
'123
The Kent II Court discusses some of the misapprehensions con-
cerning civil commitment, which caused the lower court to re-
ject it as an alternative to waiving a hard-core youth. The district
court had relied on a proposed finding that civil commitment of vio-
lent youth did not provide adequate protection for society.12 " The
court feared the hospital might commit the defendant to a non-
security facility rather than a maximum security facility. 125 In
Kent II, the Court stated that the lower court's reliance on such
"unwarranted speculations" is misplaced, since it is error to as-
sume that the hospital would negligently place a person who needed
a secure setting in a nonsecure one. 2 6 Nor was there support for
the lower court's determination that the hospital's doctors would
prematurely recommend release for criminally dangerous psy-
chotics.
1 2?
Since North Dakota's transfer statute forbids waiver of a
youth who is committable,1 28 the Kent II rationale regarding
commitment should be considered prior to waiving a hard-core
youth in North Dakota. The juvenile court system in this state, like
the District of Columbia juvenile court described in Kent II,12 9 does
not have a juvenile facility at the present time equipped to provide
psychiatric treatment for the severely disturbed youth, 3 0 nor does
the adult correctional facility have the capacity to provide treat-
ment for a sick juvenile. 1 1 But the State Mental Hospital at James-
town does have a ward equipped to treat and confine dangerous per-
sons.'3 2 Until an appropriate juvenile facility is provided for the men-
tally disturbed hard-core youth, the State Hospital at Jamestown
is the only dispositional alternative currently available to the ju-
venile court.
In North Dakota, if it appears to the juvenile judge that the
youth may be in need of treatment in a mental institution, the judge
is required by statute to commit the youth to the State Hospital for
a period not to exceed sixty days for further study and a report on
the youth's mental condition. 33 If the judge, after receiving the re-
port from the hospital should find the youth to be committable,





128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1974).
129. 401 F.2d 408, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
180. See SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE DiRECTOR OF INSTITUTIONS TO THE GOVERNOR
64-84 (1970-72) (describing the facilities at North Dakota Industrial School).
131. See Hart, Prison Transfer to Mental Institutions: The Right to Equal Protection,
49 N.D.L. REv. 815, 816-17 (1973).
132. Id. at 817 n.8.
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-35 (1974).
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North Dakota statute requires that the youth be referred to the Coun-
ty Mental Health Board for the final determination on whether or
not the youth should be committed.3 4 The Board should give
weight to the juvenile judge's findings and to the State Hospital's
reports, at the commitment hearing. 13 5 The standards for determin-
ing committability followed by the Board at the hearing are set out
in the North Dakota Century Code, 36 the Board need only find
that the youth:
a. is mentally ill, an alcoholic, or a drug addict, and
becuase of his illness is likely to injure others or himself...
or
b. is in need of custody, care, or treatment in a men-
tal hospital and because of his illness, lacks sufficient in-
sight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect
to his hospitalization.'"
Commitment of a sick juvenile is not an ideal alternative to
waiver; 1 the juvenile judge and the youth's defense counsel should
not recommend such a disposition without considering all the con-
sequences. Civil commitment has aspects of both the sword and
the shield, which exist whenever the traditional criminal process
is displaced by another system of involuntary controls.189 The legal
rights of the institutionalized are beyond the scope of this note,
but basically the problem lies in the fact that the individual has lit-
tle or no protection against an excessive term of confinement."40 It
must be remembered that the youth committed at the time of the
transfer hearing has at no time had an opportunity to be heard on
134. Id.
135. A commitment hearing is required under N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(5-6) (1970).
136. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(7). The preceding discussion of the procedure that
should be followed in North Dakota juvenile court when a youth Is found to be committable
to a mental Institution was related to the author in a telephone interview with the Hon-
orable Ralph B. Maxwell, Disrict Judge, Fargo, North Dakota. Judge Maxwell sits as
juvenile judge in the First Judicial District.
137. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(7) (Supp. 1973).
138. Ideally civil commitment in a mental institution would be unnecessary in most
cases if a secure detention and treatment facility were available to the juvenile court to
rehabilitate hard-core violent youths. Civil commitment should be looked to only when
there is no available facility In the Juvenile system. See Kent V. United, States, 401 F.2d
408, 409 (1968) (Kent II) ; In re Trader, 315 A.2d 528, 538 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
139. See N. KiRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT, DEVIANCE AND ENFORcED THERAPY 3-4
175 (1971). Kittrie discusses America's recent movement from a penal to a therapeutic
model. The author fears that the state In its parena patriae role "possesses tools of human
control that far exceed in their threat to individual liberty the sanctions possessed by the
criminal model." Id. at XVII.
140. Id.
The most common involuntary commitments in this country are for an
indeterminate time, meaning that a patient is not automatically released upon
the expiration of a specified term. Release depends on the decision of the
hospital administrators that the patient no longer requires detention and that
adequate outside facilities are available for him.
Id. at 74.
Procedural safeguards are available, however, to a patient seeking release: (1)
periodic review of his case by hospital authorities; (2) he may demand a hearing on his
condition by the hospital administration; and (3) he may appeal to courts for relief via
habeas corpus or mandamus procedures. Id.
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the merits of his case.' 4' To be sure, the juvenile judge must make
a finding that there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that the
youth committed the alleged act,'142 but at no time is there an adjudi-
cation or finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is quite possi-
ble that a youth could spend the rest of his life in a mental institu-
tion. This might be worse than spending time in prison,'4 3 for which
there is opportunity for parole, at least,' 44 if the institution does not
provide the treatment he needs. 45
In North Dakota, in determining whether or not a youth should
be waived, the juvenile court must find that not only is the youth
not committable but also that he is not amenable to treatment
or rehabilitation. 4 s The youth's amenability to treatment is the most
important and probably the only valid criterion for waiver that
should be in issue at the transfer hearing. 4 7 Unfortunately, the North
Dakota statute adds the phrase "through available facilities'
' 4 8
which operates here, as in other states, as a "convenient subterfuge
for those jurisdictions who choose to provide only the most meager
resources for treatment and rehabilitation."' 1 9
It is submitted that the phrase "through available facilities"
should be deleted from the statute because it has the effect of negat-
ing the rehabilitative purpose of the Juvenile Court Act. In North
Dakota it is the serious offender, who is most in need of the reha-
bilitation promised by the juvenile court philosophy, who the juven-
ile court will most often abandon, finding the youth to be beyond
rehabilitation in available facilities. 50 Such a finding by the court is
not completely honest. It is not the youth who is beyond rehabilitation
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-94(1) (1974). This section states that the waiver hearing
takes place before the adjudicatory hearing on the merits.
142. Id. § 27-20-34(1)(d)(1) (1974).
143. KiT'rnrE, supra note 139, at 6. The subject of a commitment proceeding is not pun-
ished, as in the criminal process, but the social sanctions often remain as severe. "[R]eturn
to society from a nonpenal institution is not necessarily any easier, and frequently is less
predictable, than return from prison. Nor is the treatment afforded in civil or therapeutic
institutions always better or more effective than In prisons." Id.
144. Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
145. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971). The theory that
institutionalized persons have a constitutional right to treatment Is expressed in this
leading mental health case: "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altru-
istic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to pro-
vide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process." Thus, if the
state confines a person without the due process safeguards of the criminal system on the
theory that he will be treated, the confinement is a violation of due process if the treat-
ment Is not forthcoming. The right to treatment of the mentally ill is beyond the scope
of this note; for a discussion of the right see Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right
of Civilly Commited Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARv. L. R v. 1282.(1973).
146. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1)(d)(2) (1974).
147. Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281, 817
(1967). Stamm states: "Juvenile court philosophy, the doctrine of parens patriae, and the
care and treatment intended by juvenile court legislation demand that the court address
itself to the single question of whether the child is amenable to treatment and rehabilita-
tion within the juvenile justice system .. " Stamm, supra note 3, at 158.
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1) (d) (2) (1974).
149. Stamm, supra note 3, at 158.
150. Limiting the juvenile court's Inquiry into the youth's amenability to treatment in
available facilities effectively denies rehabilitation to hard-core youths, since there Is no
NOTES
in the juvenile facilities; 151 it is the juvenile court which has failed to
provide the facilities for rehabilitation of seriously disturbed youths.
Thus the "available facilities" test for amenability to treatment
results in abuse-the present transfer statute allows almost every
older child to be waived when a serious offense is charged due to
lack of "available facilities.'
15 2
This problem is not unresolvable; North Dakota could look for
guidance in this area to a recent Minnesota grand jury conclusion.153
Alarmed about the rapid increase in juvenile violent crime, the Hen-
nepin County Grand Jury was faced with two alternatives as to what
the county should do with its hard-core, violent youths charged with
violent crimes. 5 4 One alternative (proposed by the police) was that
juveniles accused of violent crimes automatically be waived into
adult court and sent to St. Cloud Reformatory if convicted. The other
alternative (proposed by a juvenile judge) called for the creation of
a special rehabilitation program that would include a secure de-
tention facility to deal with hard-core youths.
After a four month study of the juvenile justice system the jury
concluded that the evidence was overwhelming that rehabilitation
would not in fact result from incarceration in adult prisons. 55 The
Grand Jury recommended that an acceptable rehabilitation pro-
gram should include both detention in a "maximally secure" faci-
lity and "gradual reintroduction into the community" based on the
youths readjustment and performance. One juror stated, "On the one
hand, you don't want a revolving door, but simply locking [hard-
core] offenders up Without any rehabilitation is not the answer. They
will come out harder.' ' 5 6 A program already designed for violent
youths in Minnesota would cost about $300,000 a year for 60
youths. 5
7
facility currently available within the juvenile court system In North Dakota to treat
them. See Comment, Representing the Juvenile Defendant in Waiver Proceedings, 12 ST.
Lovis U.L.J. 424, 457 (1968) for the proposition that it is patently unfair to transfer a
youth who could be benefitted by intensive treatment because of lack of facilities for
such care.
151. Stamm, supra note 3, at 162-63. Stamm suggests that diagnosis and prognosis of a
youth's amenability to treatment is such delicate, tentative and speculative work that It
Is "virtually impossible to predict that any child cannot benefit from proper treatment
within the juvenile system." See Comment, supra note 150, at 457.
152. See Stamm, supra note 3, at 158. Other states which use the "available facilities"
test circumvent the juvenile court philosophy in the same way.
159. Stone, Grand Jury Urges Rehabilitation Plan for Juveniles, Minneapolis Tribune,




157. Id. North Dakota has a small population and a low crime rate and may not feel
that the expense of a secure facility staffed with personnel equipped to treat severely
disturbed youths, could be justified for the small number of youths who would be affected.
Perhaps an agreement with Minnesota could be drawn up which would permit North Da-
kota juvenile courts to commit hard-core youths to the new Minnesota facility, although
such a procedure could have constitutional difficulties of Its own if It were found to be
"cruel and unusual" to detain a youth too far from his family.
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North Dakota should plan a rehabilitative program for hard-
core youths consistent with the philosophy of the juvenile court, be-
cause it is in the best interest of the state to do so' s and because an
emerging doctrine of right to treatment for juveniles is now placing
an affirmative duty on the states to provide individualized care and
guidance to institutionalized youths. 159 A United States Court of
Appeals has recognized that a constitutional right to treatment exists
for juveniles in the case of Nelson v. Heyne.160
Nelson defined the right to treatment as including (1) the right
to mimimum acceptable standards of general care and treatment, 8 '
(this would include food, clothing, shelter, education and basic med-
ical care)162 and (2) the right to individualized care and treatment. 68
This requires the state to provide an affirmative treatment program
that would meet the needs of the youth. Such a program would include
psychiatric and psychological services to deal with diagnosed, in-
dividual problems, medical treatment for disabilities, and special
education.1"
The questions that arise are: Will Nelson have an effect on
North Dakota? What will a constitutional right to treatment for ju-
veniles require North Dakota to do? Since the district court's opin-
ion that the right to rehabilitative treatment is secured under both
Indiana law and the federal constitution8 5 was accepted by the ap-
pellate court in Nelson,'68 and since North Dakota has nearly the same
provision in its Juvenile Court Act'67 as the Indiana Code section re-
158. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974). Judge Kiley stated that with-
out a program of individual treatment juveniles will not be capable of taking their place
in free society, defeating the interest of the state in having a self-sufficient citizenry. Id.
159. See KrRiE, supra note 139 ; Note, Judicial Recognition and Implementation of a
Right to Treatment for Institutionalized Juveniles, 49 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1051 (1974)
Note, A Right to Treatment for Juveniles, 1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 151.
160. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974). Two early (1967) cases addressed the problem of the
treatment afforded in juvenile facilities: In re Elmore, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 176, 382 F.2d
125 (1967) and Creek v. Stone, 126 U.S. App. D.C. 329, 879 F.2d 106 (1967). Both cases
held that a juvenile is entitled as of right to a "custody that is not inconsistent with the
parens patriae premise of the law." 329 U.S. App. D.C. at 334, 379 F.2d at 111. A recent
federal district court found a clear constitutional right to treatment based on the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. In Martarella v. Killey, 349 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) the
court said: "Where the state, as parens patriae imposes . . . detention, It can meet the
Constitution's requirement of due process and prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment If, and only If, It furnishes adequate treatment to the detainee." Id. at 585.
161. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974).
162. Note, Judicial Recognition and Implementation of a Right to Treatment for Institu-
tionalized Juveniles, 49 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 1051, 1058 (1974).
163. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974).
164. Note, supra note 162, at 1058.
165. Nelson v. Ieyne, 855 F. Supp. 451, 459 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd 491 F.2d 852 (7th
Cir. 1974).
166. 491 F.2d at 358.
167. N.D. CEN'r. CODE § 27-20-01 (1974). The North Dakota Juvenile Court Act sets forth
its public purpose:
To provide for the care, protection and wholesome moral, mental, and physi-
cal development of children coming within its provisions; consistent with the
protection of the public interest, to remove from children committing delin-
quent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior
and to substitute therefore a program of treatment, training and rehabilita-
NOTES
ferred to, 1 68 Nelson would probably be followed by the Eighth Cir-
cuit. The right to treatment would place a heavy burden on North
Dakota to provide the kinds of rehabilitation that will give substance
to the words in the Juvenile Court Act. 169 The North Dakota Juvenile
Court Act purports to remove from children the consequences of cri-
minal behavior and substitute therefor a program of treatment,
training and rehabilitation. 170
V. CONCLUSION
The right to treatment extends to all children coming within
the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, including the hard-core,
violent youth. Any other interpretation of the statute does violence
to the institution of juvenile justice and makes the juvenile court an ar-
bitrary forum where those who are most in need of its care can be
abandoned at the whim of the court.
This note has proposed that the hard-core youth has a right to the
same rehabilitative treatment that is available to all children com-
ing within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The states should not
attempt to exclude the hard-core youth from the juvenile system by
statutory schemes which place the waiver decision-making power
in the hands of the prosecutor. North Dakota should not exclude its
hard-core youths by testing their amenability to treatment by an
"available facilities" standard.
The burden is on the juvenile court, the community and the leg-
islators in this state to demand appropriate facilities to treat the
hard-core youth. A society which turns its back on its disturbed
youths by detaining them in prison is not only inhumane, but short-
sighted.
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tion; to achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment whenever
possible . ..
Id.
168. IND. AN-N. STAT. § 9-3201 (Burns 1971). The Indiana Juvenile Court Act sets forth
as its purpose and basic principle:
to secure for each child within its provisions such care, guidance and control,
preferably in his own home, a's will serve the child's welfare and the best
interests of the states; and when such child is removed from his own family,
to secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent
to that which should have been given by his parents.
Id.
169. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
170. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01(2) (1974).

